§7 xArm 850
What can hurt you, the rules that prevent it, and the safeguards at S2 that are not yet confirmed.
This section says what can hurt you around this arm, the rules that prevent it, which safety functions the machine has and what they are not, and which safeguards at the cell nobody has confirmed yet. If you read only one part of this site before going near the arm, read this one.
S2 in one line: S2 is the xArm 850 arm that picks up incoming material and moves it between receiving, staging and production45.
Not yet confirmed at S2
Nobody has confirmed these safeguards at the physical S2 cell yet. Until someone does, assume none of them exist.
A question from earlier on, to keep it fresh. Skip it if you like; nothing depends on it.
Choose your depth
1Beginner
For: Anyone with no robotics background: a visitor, a new operator, a manager
Kind of task: Recognise and recall, with plain-language explanations and pictures
In this part you learn what a robot arm can do to a person, the rules that keep you out of harm's way, and what to do in an emergency. No robotics background is needed. Read it before you go near the arm, even if you only mean to watch.
We don't yet know where S2's emergency stops are, whether it has guarding, or whether its risk assessment has been done679. This project's advice: until someone confirms them, act as though none of them exists, and stay out of the working area while the arm runs50.
Not yet confirmed at S2
Nobody has confirmed these safeguards at the physical S2 cell yet. Until someone does, assume none of them exist.
Answer, then check. Each option has its own feedback, and nothing is scored.
2Novice
For: Someone who will work near or with the cell: operator, trainee technician
Kind of task: Explain and sequence: put steps in order, match parts to their functions
In this part you learn the safety functions the machine has, how an emergency stop differs from a protective stop, and which of the arm's features protect people and which do not. It is for someone who will work near or with the cell.
Answer, then check. Each option has its own feedback, and nothing is scored.
3Intermediate
For: Someone who will set up, program or maintain the arm: technician, student engineer
Kind of task: Apply: work through written scenarios that need a decision (which mode, which setting, what to do about this error), with feedback on each choice. Simulation added in M2/M4 extends this; it does not define it
In this part you learn how the arm stops, how safety signals must be wired, which settings change what the safety functions do, and where the published figures run out. It is for someone who will set up, program or maintain the arm.
UFACTORY measured Stop Category 1 stops with the arm fully extended horizontally, at 100% speed (joint speed 180 °/s) and with a 5 kg payload at the tool centre point834084418542:
Answer, then check. Each option has its own feedback, and nothing is scored.
4Expert
For: Someone who designs, integrates or changes the cell: integrator, engineer, the M5 team
Kind of task: Analyse and decide: weigh trade-offs, resolve contradictions, critique a configuration
In this part you test the safety evidence behind the machine against the standards, see what the certificates do and do not show, and work out what an autonomous agent at the cell must never be allowed to change. It is for someone who designs, integrates or changes the cell.
Answer, then check. Each option has its own feedback, and nothing is scored.
What the sources do not settle for this section. Nothing here is papered over with a plausible number.
The S2 installation's risk assessment has not been confirmed: whether one exists for the complete S2 application (arm, gripper, workpieces, S1/S3/S4/S6 interfaces), who performed and signed it, and whether it was redone after installation as UFACTORY requires.
See reference 6The locations of the S2 emergency stops are unknown: whether any e-stop buttons beyond the control box button are wired to EI, where they are, and whether S2 shares an emergency stop circuit with S6 or other stations.
See reference 7The position of the S2 control box is unknown: whether it is outside the arm's working range, at 0.6 to 1.5 m height, with its e-stop reachable.
See reference 8S2's guarding and protective devices are unknown: whether fences, interlocked doors, light curtains, safety mats or laser scanners are wired to the SI protective stop input, or whether SI is still in its factory default state with no additional safety equipment.
See reference 9It is unknown whether S2 is intended to be a collaborative application, with people entering the arm's working area during automatic operation. If it is, it is also unknown which collaborative method is used and how it has been validated.
See reference 10It is unknown whether S2's working range, including the gripper, is marked on the floor or bench as UFACTORY recommends.
See reference 11It is unknown what the S2 gripper does to a held workpiece on power loss or e-stop (holds or drops), and what lies beneath the arm's path if a part drops.
See reference 12Whether S11 IntelliAware has any authority to stop or slow S2, whether it is a safety-rated protective device, and who owns S11 are not documented (Q14f). The diagram calls S11 'monitoring of ... safety', which does not make it a safeguard.
See reference 13The 850 manual's e-stop figures appear inconsistent. Section 2.1.2 says arm power is removed within 300 ms of pressing the e-stop. Section 7.8 says the e-stop is Stop Category 1, which decelerates 'with drive power on'. Section 7.9 gives Stop Category 1 stopping times of 521 to 885 ms. UFACTORY does not explain how power removal within 300 ms fits a powered deceleration lasting up to 885 ms (the brakes may do the rest of the stopping, but no source says so).
See reference 43The 850 product page calls UFACTORY arms 'Collaborative Robots' and 'cobots'. A3 says ISO 10218:2025 drops 'collaborative robot' because only an application can be confirmed as collaborative, and UFACTORY's own 850 manual says no people should be in the working area during operation. The marketing label does not establish that S2 is a collaborative application.
See reference 45UFACTORY documents disagree on the collision sensitivity range. The Studio Settings page says 1 to 5, while the Studio glossary, the Python SDK and the xArm Developer Manual say 0 to 5, with 0 disabling collision detection. A learner reading only the Settings page would not learn that the value can switch detection off.
See reference 62No UFACTORY source was found that says whether the software safety functions (collision detection, safety boundary, reduced mode) are enforced independently of the motion-command path. It is also unknown whether the safety boundary checks the tool and the arm's links, or only the TCP; the documentation mentions only the TCP.
See reference 66It is unknown whether S2 operators have been trained, as UFACTORY requires, and whether maintenance and safety-configuration changes are documented.
See reference 79UFACTORY publishes Stop Category 1 stop data only for Joints 1 to 3 at 100% extension, 100% speed and a 5 kg payload. No data was found for Joints 4 to 6, for other speeds or payloads, for Stop Category 2 (the SI safeguard stop), or for stopping after a collision is detected. These are needed for any separation-distance calculation.
See reference 87It is unknown whether any S2 safety signals pass through a PLC, and if so whether it is a safety-rated PLC.
See reference 112The S2 arm's current safety settings are unknown: collision detection on or off, collision sensitivity level, safety boundary on and its limits, reduced mode and its limits, self-collision tool model, TCP payload and mounting direction.
See reference 113It is unknown whether the documented default Advanced Settings password has been changed on the S2 controller, and who can change its safety-related settings.
See reference 114It is unknown which CI inputs at S2, if any, are configured as Stop Moving, Safeguard Reset, Reduced Mode or Manual Mode, and where any safeguard reset button is located relative to the safeguarded zone.
See reference 115The EC/EU Declaration of Conformity for the 850 was not found or fetched. The SGS verifications say the CE mark depends on one, and the product page says only 'Certifications Complete(CE)'. Nothing fetched from UFACTORY states conformity with ISO 10218-1:2025 or ISO 10218-2.
See reference 122The fetched text does not tie the certificate model numbers XI13 and XI15 to the name 'UFACTORY 850', although UFACTORY links the certificates from the 850 manual. It is also unknown which of these model numbers appears on the S2 arm's label.
See reference 124No fetched UFACTORY source states an ISO 13849-1 Performance Level (PL) or Category, or an IEC 62061 SIL, for any 850 safety function (e-stop, EI/SI inputs, collision detection, safety boundary or reduced mode). No TÜV certification was found. Do not assume any.
See reference 125The ISO 10218-1/-2:2025 texts and ISO/TS 15066 are paywalled and were not read. No clause numbers, force or pressure limits, or required PL values from them are recorded in this corpus.
See reference 131No fetched source shows the 850 assessed for collaborative power and force limiting (the former ISO/TS 15066 content, now in ISO 10218-2:2025). The SGS verification covers only EN ISO 10218-1:2011 (safety-082), so the permissible contact forces and speeds for collaborative use are undocumented.
See reference 135No fetched UFACTORY source says whether the 850 is suitable or validated for power and force limiting collaborative applications. UFACTORY publishes no contact force or pressure figures, and gives no force or torque threshold for each collision sensitivity level.
See reference 136No fetched UFACTORY source gives an explicit intended-use or reasonably foreseeable misuse statement for the 850, beyond environmental limits and general warnings.
See reference 143No fetched UFACTORY source identifies specific pinch or crush points on the 850, such as between links or at the gripper fingers. The pinch and crush hazard descriptions found come from OSHA's general guidance.
See reference 144The 850 manual's 'Limitation of Liability' sentence reads, as published, that safety information 'must be construed as a warranty by UFACTORY [sic], that the 850 will not cause injury or damage even if all safety instructions are complied with'. This is the opposite of what a limitation of liability usually says, and is probably a drafting error for 'must not be construed'. UFACTORY's intended wording is unconfirmed. Do not read it as a guarantee of safety.
See reference 145S2's controller type (AC or DC), firmware version and SDK version are unknown. Firmware determines which reduced-mode and fence APIs are available (1.2.0 or 1.2.11 and above).
See reference 150The 850 product page and manual text do not themselves state conformance to ISO 10218-1 or ISO/TS 15066. The only ISO 10218 evidence found is the SGS verification linked from the manual, which is against EN ISO 10218-1:2011 (safety-082, safety-086). No assessment against the 2025 editions was found.
See reference 157Each number in the text points here. Every entry states its confidence class in words and keeps its evidence one click away. How to read the labels.
The record says
UFACTORY says no people or other equipment should be in the 850's working area while the arm is operating.
When the robotic arm is in operation, make sure no people or other equipment are in the working area.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, DANGER list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
An 850 that looks stopped may be waiting for a signal and about to move; UFACTORY says to treat it as moving.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: 1.4 Personnel Safety, CAUTION.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.4 Personnel Safety, CAUTION
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The 850 control box front panel has a ROBOT PWR indicator (on when the arm is powered), a STATE indicator (flashes when the control box is powered), a LAN indicator (on when communicating normally), and an EMERGENCY STOP button.
ROBOT power indicator ROBOT PWR The light is on, indicating that the 850 is powered on.
UFACTORY 850 User Manual V2.3.0 (PDF, older edition) · UFACTORY · Hardware Section 1.1.3 Control Box Description, p.20 (manual names the machine '850' / 'UFactory 850')
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Emergency stop button EMERGENCY STOP
UFACTORY 850 User Manual V2.3.0 (PDF, older edition) · UFACTORY · same table (manual names the machine '850' / 'UFactory 850')
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Control Box power status indicator STATE The light flashes, indicating that the control box is powered on.
UFACTORY 850 User Manual V2.3.0 (PDF, older edition) · UFACTORY · same table (manual names the machine '850' / 'UFactory 850')
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Network port indicator LAN The light is on, indicating that the 850 is communicating normally.
UFACTORY 850 User Manual V2.3.0 (PDF, older edition) · UFACTORY · same table (manual names the machine '850' / 'UFactory 850')
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Station S2 of the Phase 1 factory is the UFactory xArm 850 cobot.
S2 UFactory xArm 850 Cobot
IntelliMake Phase 1 Factory: Autonomous Production Demonstrator (infographic) · IntelliMake.org · S2 station label
© IntelliMake.org. Used with permission; redrawn for this platform. · Cleared for use by its owner · retrieved 2026-09-21
Project copy; not published on this site.
UFactory xArm 850 | S2
IntelliMake Phase 1 Factory: Autonomous Production Demonstrator (infographic) · IntelliMake.org · HW2 SME topic mapping table
© IntelliMake.org. Used with permission; redrawn for this platform. · Cleared for use by its owner · retrieved 2026-09-21
Project copy; not published on this site.
The record says
S2 picks and transfers incoming material between receiving, staging and production.
Picks and transfers incoming material between receiving, staging, and production.
IntelliMake Phase 1 Factory: Autonomous Production Demonstrator (infographic) · IntelliMake.org · S2 station description
© IntelliMake.org. Used with permission; redrawn for this platform. · Cleared for use by its owner · retrieved 2026-09-21
Project copy; not published on this site.
Not known
The S2 installation's risk assessment has not been confirmed: whether one exists for the complete S2 application (arm, gripper, workpieces, S1/S3/S4/S6 interfaces), who performed and signed it, and whether it was redone after installation as UFACTORY requires.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
Making a risk assessment for the complete system.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.1
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
The locations of the S2 emergency stops are unknown: whether any e-stop buttons beyond the control box button are wired to EI, where they are, and whether S2 shares an emergency stop circuit with S6 or other stations.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
In most applications, one or more additional emergency stop buttons are required.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1.1
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
The position of the S2 control box is unknown: whether it is outside the arm's working range, at 0.6 to 1.5 m height, with its e-stop reachable.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
The Control Box must be placed outside the working range of the robotic arm to ensure the emergency stop button can be pressed once an emergency occurs.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, CAUTION
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
S2's guarding and protective devices are unknown: whether fences, interlocked doors, light curtains, safety mats or laser scanners are wired to the SI protective stop input, or whether SI is still in its factory default state with no additional safety equipment.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
The robotic arm has been configured by default and can be operated without any additional safety equipment
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
It is unknown whether S2 is intended to be a collaborative application, with people entering the arm's working area during automatic operation. If it is, it is also unknown which collaborative method is used and how it has been validated.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
“Collaborative application” is used instead, as only the actual use of the robot can be designed, tested, and confirmed as a collaborative application.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 6
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
It is unknown whether S2's working range, including the gripper, is marked on the floor or bench as UFACTORY recommends.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
A line should be drawn to mark the range of motion of the robotic arm
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.4
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
It is unknown what the S2 gripper does to a held workpiece on power loss or e-stop (holds or drops), and what lies beneath the arm's path if a part drops.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
Make sure that the connecting tool and the gripper do not cause any danger when the power is cut
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual V2.6.1 (PDF) · UFACTORY · 4.2 Tool IO, DANGER
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
Whether S11 IntelliAware has any authority to stop or slow S2, whether it is a safety-rated protective device, and who owns S11 are not documented (Q14f). The diagram calls S11 'monitoring of ... safety', which does not make it a safeguard.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
Related: int-024 Verified
AI vision-based monitoring of factory operations, equipment, processes, and safety.
IntelliMake Phase 1 Factory: Autonomous Production Demonstrator (infographic) · IntelliMake.org · S11 label and description
© IntelliMake.org. Used with permission; redrawn for this platform. · Cleared for use by its owner · retrieved 2026-09-21
Project copy; not published on this site.
The record says
OSHA groups robot application hazards into major types including impact, collision or other struck-by/caught-between hazards, crushing and trapping of body parts between the robot, end-effector or workpiece and other equipment, and struck-by projectiles such as released parts or gripper mechanism failure.
Similar to above, a worker's limb or other body part can be trapped within or between a robot, end-effector, or workpiece and another robot, or other peripheral equipment, resulting in potential crushing injuries.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · V. Hazards Associated with Industrial Robot Applications
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Parts release, gripper mechanism failure, or end-effector power tool failure
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · V., Struck-by Projectiles Hazards
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Hazards can be grouped into the following major types:
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · V. Hazards Associated with Industrial Robot Applications, Robot Application Hazards
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Impact, Collision, or other "Struck-by/Caught-between" Hazards
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · V., Robot Application Hazards
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Crushing and Trapping Hazards
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · V., Robot Application Hazards
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Struck-by Projectiles Hazards
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · V., Robot Application Hazards
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY warns that items can drop from the 850 if power is lost accidentally or if the gripper holds them unstably.
Be careful about dropping items that can be caused by accidental power off or unstable clamping of the robotic arm.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.4 Personnel Safety, CAUTION
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The 850 arm and control box get hot in operation; UFACTORY says not to handle or touch them during or immediately after operation.
The robotic arm and Control Box will generate heat during operation. Do not handle or touch the robotic arm and Control Box while in operation or immediately after the operation.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, HIGH TEMPERATURE
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY warns never to put fingers into the end-effector connector.
Never stick fingers to the connector of the end-effector.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, HIGH TEMPERATURE block
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY warns users to take care when the arm is running too fast.
Be careful when the robotic arm is running too fast.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.4 Personnel Safety, CAUTION
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
To avoid electric shock, the 850 arm cable must not be connected or disconnected while the system is connected to external AC power.
When connecting or disconnecting the arm cable, make sure that the external AC is disconnected. To avoid any electric shock hazard, do not connect or disconnect the robotic arm cable when the robotic arm is connecting with external AC.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.2.1 Safety Guidelines, WARNING
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY warns that the controller's power supply may retain high voltage for several hours after shutdown, and says not to disassemble it.
Avoid disassembling the power supply system within the controller. The power supply system may retain high voltage for several hours after the controller is shut down.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.4 Personnel Safety, DANGER
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY recommends marking the arm's range of motion with a line, including the reach of its end tools such as grippers and suction cups.
A line should be drawn to mark the range of motion of the robotic arm to let the operator acknowledge the robotic arm, including its end tools (such as gripper and suction cup, etc) operating range.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.4 Personnel Safety, CAUTION
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says the arm must be installed with its range of motion in mind so that it does not hit people or equipment nearby, and notes that its published working range excludes the end-effector.
When installing the robotic arm, make sure the range of motion of the robotic arm is taken into account, so as not to bump into the surrounding people and equipment (the end-effector not included in the working range).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.2.2 Define Working Space
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says the device and system must be checked before each use, and the arm and the peripheral protection system must be tested and inspected before production.
The integrity of the device and system must be checked before each use (e. g. the operational safety and the possible damage of the robotic arm and other device systems).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, DANGER list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Preliminary testing and inspection for both robotic arm and peripheral protection system before production is essential.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, DANGER list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says installation and commissioning must be done by professionals, and operators must be trained in the SDK and UFACTORY Studio.
Please follow the instructions in this manual, installation, and commissioning needs to be performed by professionals in accordance
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, DANGER list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The operator must be trained to guarantee a correct operation procedure when using SDK(Python/ROS/C++) and graphical interface UFactory studio.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, DANGER list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The UFACTORY 850 has a reach of 850 mm.
Reach 850 mm
UFACTORY 850 product page · UFACTORY · Products menu entry for the 850 (page names the machine 'UFACTORY 850'; spec tables say 'UFactory 850')
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Maximum Reach 850mm
UFACTORY 850 User Manual V2.3.0 (PDF, older edition) · UFACTORY · Appendix 7, 1.11 Specifications, p.185 (manual names the machine '850' / 'UFactory 850')
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
OSHA says many robot accidents happen during non-routine work such as programming, maintenance, testing, setup or adjustment, when a worker may be inside the robot's working envelope.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: Robotics overview.
OSHA Safety and Health Topics: Robotics (overview) · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Robotics overview
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
In manual mode the arm compensates for gravity ('zero gravity'), so a person can move it by hand to teach positions.
In this mode, the robotic arm will enter the ‘zero gravity’ mode, since the gravity is compensated, the user can guide the robotic arm position directly by hand.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 2. Glossary · UFACTORY · Glossary, 'Manual Mode'
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Before switching on manual (drag-teach) mode, UFACTORY says to confirm that the mounting direction and TCP payload are set correctly; otherwise gravity compensation may be wrong and the arm may not stay still.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: Mode 2: Manual Mode, NOTE.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 10. Robotic Arm Motion Mode and State · UFACTORY · Mode 2: Manual Mode, NOTE
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says the control box must be placed outside the arm's working range so that its emergency stop button can be reached in an emergency.
The Control Box must be placed outside the working range of the robotic arm to ensure the emergency stop button can be pressed once an emergency occurs.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, CAUTION
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says the controller should be placed at a height of 0.6 m to 1.5 m.
The controller should be placed at a height of 0.6m to 1.5m.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.5 Controller Placement Height
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
When the emergency stop is pressed, the 850 does not hold perfectly still: UFACTORY says it will brake slightly and fall.
When an emergency occurs during the operation of the robotic arm, users need to press the emergency stop, and the posture of the robotic arm will slightly brake and fall.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.1.2 Emergency Stop Button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY states that the emergency stop should not be used as a risk reduction measure.
The emergency stop should not be used as a risk reduction measure.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.1.2 Emergency Stop Button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The Studio STOP button stops the arm immediately and clears all cached commands; it is a software stop and the power stays on.
**STOP:** The robotic arm will stop immediately and clear all cache commands. It's a **software stop**, the power is still on.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 4. Live Control · UFACTORY · 4.5 Enable & STOP button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Project advice
Do not count a software stop (Studio's STOP, SDK set_state(4) or SDK emergency_stop()) as an emergency stop or safeguard in the S2 risk assessment.
This is advice from this project, based on: safety-089 Inferred safety-035 Verified safety-036 Verified safety-025 Verified
Why: Software stops leave arm power on and are not the hardware emergency stop (safety-089, safety-035, safety-036), which removes arm power (safety-025). Crediting them as an emergency stop would overstate the protection the cell has.
The record says
After an emergency stop, UFACTORY says to make sure the restart or reset motions will not hit any obstacle.
If the robotic arm is in operation and needs an emergency stop, make sure the restart/reset motions will not collide with any obstacle.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, CAUTION
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Restarting after an emergency stop takes two steps: release the button by turning it in the arrow's direction to re-power the arm, then enable the servos from UFACTORY Studio or with motion_enable(true) in the Python SDK.
Power up the 850 (Turn the emergency stop button in the direction of the arrow).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.1.2, restart procedure
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Enable the 850 (enable the servo motor), Enable button on the UFACTOR Studio or
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual V2.6.1 (PDF) · UFACTORY · 2.1.2 (PDF p. 11)
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Enable the 850 (enable the servo motor), Enable button on the UFACTOR Studio or Python SDK motion_enable(true).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.1.2, restart procedure
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The 850's joint modules contain brakes that UFACTORY says hold the arm's pose during a power outage.
The 850 joint module has brakes inside, which will remain manipulator’s pose when a power outage occurs.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, DANGER list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Pressing the control box emergency stop makes the controller decelerate the arm in software, clears all cached commands, and removes power from the arm within 300 ms; the arm will slightly brake and fall.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: 2.1.2 Emergency Stop Button.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.1.2 Emergency Stop Button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
the posture of the robotic arm will slightly brake and fall.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.1.2 Emergency Stop Button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The control box emergency stop button performs a Stop Category 1.
Emergency Stop Button of the Control Box Stop Category 1
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.8 Stop Categories table (docs site 'UFACTORY 850 硬件手册', English version; names the machine 'UFACTORY 850')
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY's measured Stop Category 1 stopping time for Joint 1 is 521 ms (Stop Category 1, arm fully extended horizontally, 100% speed (joint speed 180 °/s), 5 kg payload at TCP; Joint 1 tested with a horizontal movement.)
Joint1 0.62 521
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9 Stop Time and Stop Distance, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Payload: maximum payload handled by the robot attached to the TCP (5 kg).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Speed: 100% (the general speed of the robot is set to 100% and the movement is performed at a joint speed of 180 °/s).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The test on the Joint 1 was carried out by performing a horizontal movement, the axis of rotation was perpendicular to the ground.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Extension: 100% (the robot arm is fully extended horizontally).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY's measured Stop Category 1 stopping time for Joint 2 is 885 ms (Stop Category 1, arm fully extended horizontally, 100% speed (joint speed 180 °/s), 5 kg payload at TCP; Joint 2 and 3 measured moving downwards.)
Joint2 1.12 885
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9 Stop Time and Stop Distance, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Payload: maximum payload handled by the robot attached to the TCP (5 kg).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Speed: 100% (the general speed of the robot is set to 100% and the movement is performed at a joint speed of 180 °/s).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
During the tests for Joint 2 and 3 the robot followed a vertical trajectory, i.e. the axes of rotation were parallel to the ground, and the stop was performed while the robot was moving downwards.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Extension: 100% (the robot arm is fully extended horizontally).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY's measured Stop Category 1 stopping time for Joint 3 is 577 ms (Stop Category 1, arm fully extended horizontally, 100% speed (joint speed 180 °/s), 5 kg payload at TCP; Joint 2 and 3 measured moving downwards.)
Joint3 0.67 577
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9 Stop Time and Stop Distance, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Payload: maximum payload handled by the robot attached to the TCP (5 kg).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Speed: 100% (the general speed of the robot is set to 100% and the movement is performed at a joint speed of 180 °/s).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
During the tests for Joint 2 and 3 the robot followed a vertical trajectory, i.e. the axes of rotation were parallel to the ground, and the stop was performed while the robot was moving downwards.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Extension: 100% (the robot arm is fully extended horizontally).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Sources disagree
The 850 manual's e-stop figures appear inconsistent. Section 2.1.2 says arm power is removed within 300 ms of pressing the e-stop. Section 7.8 says the e-stop is Stop Category 1, which decelerates 'with drive power on'. Section 7.9 gives Stop Category 1 stopping times of 521 to 885 ms. UFACTORY does not explain how power removal within 300 ms fits a powered deceleration lasting up to 885 ms (the brakes may do the rest of the stopping, but no source says so).
Related: safety-025 Verified safety-042 Verified safety-043 Verified safety-044 Verified safety-045 Verified safety-046 Verified safety-047 Verified safety-048 Verified comp-024 Verified comp-026 Verified
the power supply for the robotic arm will be removed within 300ms.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.1.2 Emergency Stop Button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Stop Category 1 and Stop Category 2 decelerates the robot with drive power on, which enables the robot to stop without deviating from its current path.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.8 Stop Categories
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Emergency Stop Button of the Control Box Stop Category 1
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.8 Stop Categories, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Joint1 0.62 521
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9 Stop Time and Stop Distance, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Joint2 1.12 885
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9 Stop Time and Stop Distance, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Joint3 0.67 577
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9 Stop Time and Stop Distance, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Releasing the 850's brakes can let the arm fall: UFACTORY says someone must support the arm, and protective measures must be taken to prevent damage or injury.
DANGER: When releasing the joint brakes, someone must support the robot's posture to prevent the robotic arm from falling without external force and damage the robotic arm and surrounding equipment.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.4.2 Debugging Tools, Joint
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
When releasing the brakes of 850, please take protective measures to prevent the robotic arm or operator from damage or injury.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, DANGER list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Sources disagree
The 850 product page calls UFACTORY arms 'Collaborative Robots' and 'cobots'. A3 says ISO 10218:2025 drops 'collaborative robot' because only an application can be confirmed as collaborative, and UFACTORY's own 850 manual says no people should be in the working area during operation. The marketing label does not establish that S2 is a collaborative application.
Durable Collaborative Robots with Easy Deployment
UFACTORY 850 product page · UFACTORY · Section heading
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
“Collaborative application” is used instead, as only the actual use of the robot can be designed, tested, and confirmed as a collaborative application.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 6
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
When the robotic arm is in operation, make sure no people or other equipment are in the working area.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, DANGER list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY makes the integrator of the 850 responsible for a risk assessment of the complete system, including keeping a safe distance between people and the 850 when they interact with it.
Making a risk assessment for the complete system. Make sure to have a safe distance between people and 850 when interacting with the 850.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.1 Validity and Responsibility, integrator responsibilities list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
No fetched UFACTORY document calls the 850's collision detection, safety boundary or reduced mode safety-rated, or gives them a performance level.
Why we infer this: Verified: collision detection is a model-based current comparison that UFACTORY says can false-trigger with wrong settings and can be disabled (level 0, Advanced Settings toggle, a documented default password); safety boundary and reduced mode are software settings exposed in Studio and the SDK. UFACTORY distinguishes safety signals (EI/SI, redundant pairs) from non-safety devices. Inferred: no fetched UFACTORY source assigns a PL, Category or safety rating to these software functions (see the gap on performance level); this is a statement about the documents fetched, not proof that no rating exists.
By comparing the theoretical current and actual current of each joint, the system determines whether a collision has occurred.
Collision Detection in UFACTORY Robotic Arms: Current and Dynamic Model-based Feature (UFACTORY support article) · UFACTORY · Section 1
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
When it is set to 0, it means that collision detection is not enabled.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 2. Glossary · UFACTORY · Glossary, Collision Sensitivity
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Never connect a safety signal to a non-safety PLC.Failure to follow this warning may result in serious injury or death due to an invalid safety stop function.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.1 Electrical Alarms and Cautions
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Project advice
Treat the 850's collision detection, safety boundary and reduced mode as configurable controller functions, not as validated safeguards: they must not replace the risk-assessed protective devices wired to the EI and SI inputs.
This is advice from this project, based on: safety-087 Inferred safety-062 Verified safety-067 Verified safety-073 Verified safety-074 Verified safety-057 Verified
Why: No fetched UFACTORY document gives these functions a safety rating or performance level (safety-087). Collision detection is a current-model comparison that can false-trigger and can be switched off (safety-062, safety-067); safety boundary and reduced mode are software settings (safety-073, safety-074). UFACTORY keeps safety signals separate from non-safety devices (safety-057). A function with no documented rating cannot stand in for a rated protective device.
Project advice
Until S11's safety function is documented and verified, neither learners nor the S2 agent should treat S11 or the cameras as a safeguard. The S2 agent must not rely on them to stop motion or to protect people.
This is advice from this project, based on: int-024 Verified int-050 Gap, awaiting cell access
Why: S11 is described only as monitoring that includes safety (int-024). Nothing establishes a safety rating, stop authority or response time (int-050). Treating an unrated monitoring system as a safeguard is the failure the Q3 disposition warns against: an Assumed safeguard mistaken for a confirmed one.
Project advice
Until S2's emergency stops, guarding and risk assessment are confirmed at the physical cell, act as though none of them exists: stay out of the working area while the arm runs, and do not rely on a safeguard nobody has confirmed.
This is advice from this project, based on: safety-127 Gap, awaiting cell access safety-128 Gap, awaiting cell access safety-130 Gap, awaiting cell access safety-009 Verified safety-002 Verified
Why: Where S2's emergency stops are (safety-128), whether it has guarding or protective devices (safety-130) and whether its risk assessment exists (safety-127) are all recorded as unconfirmed. UFACTORY says no people should be in the working area during operation (safety-009) and makes the integrator responsible for the risk assessment (safety-002). Wrongly assuming a safeguard exists can cost an injury; wrongly assuming it is absent costs only caution.
The record says
The STOP button in UFACTORY Studio is a software stop that leaves arm power on.
The robotic arm will stop immediately and clear all cache commands. It's a software stop , the power is still on.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 4. Live Control · UFACTORY · 4.5 Enable & STOP button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The 850 control box has two fixed safety inputs: the emergency stop input (EI), used only for emergency stops, and the protective stop input (SI), used for all other safety protection.
There are two fixed safety inputs: The robotic arm emergency stop input is only used for the emergency stop of the device. The protective stop input is used for all types of safety protection.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1 Safety IO(EISI)
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
An emergency stop halts the program and needs a manual reset, while a protective stop only suspends the program and can reset automatically or manually. UFACTORY says protective stops have no usage-frequency limit, but emergency stops are for infrequent use.
Program execution Stop Suspend Reset Manual Auto or manual Usage frequency Not frequent No limit
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1, Emergency Stop vs Protective Stop table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Out of the box, the 850 controller is configured to run without any additional safety equipment. The manual shows the default wiring in a figure; the terminals EI1, EI2, SI0 and SI1 are named in the next subsection, which covers adding an emergency stop button.
The robotic arm has been configured by default and can be operated without any additional safety equipment, as the figure below.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1 Safety IO(EISI)
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Digital IO: EI1, EI2, SI0, SI1.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1.1
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says most applications need one or more additional emergency stop buttons, and that when the arm works with other machines a common emergency stop circuit is usually needed.
In most applications, one or more additional emergency stop buttons are required.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1.1 Connect to Emergency Stop Button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
When a robotic arm is used with other machines, it requires to set up a common emergency stop circuit in most of the time.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1.2 Share Emergency Stop with other Machines
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY gives a door switch as an example of a basic protective stop device (when the door is open, the arm stops), and a safety pad or a safety laser scanner as another example of automatic recovery.
The door switch is an example of a basic protective stop device. When the door is open, the robotic arm stops.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1.3 Automatically Recoverable Protective Stop
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Another example of an automatic recovery is the use of a safety pad or a safety laser scanner
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1.3
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY calls the control box the core of the 850: it houses the arm's control system.
The control box, core part of the robotic arm, is the integration of the robotic arm control system.
UFACTORY 850 User Manual V2.3.0 (PDF, older edition) · UFACTORY · Terms and Definitions, 'Control Box', p.6 (manual names the machine '850' / 'UFactory 850')
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
When the control box reports an error in the arm's hardware, the control box software, or a sent command, the arm stops immediately and discards the control box's cached commands; the error must be cleared manually before normal operation resumes.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: 12.1 Control Box Error Code and Handling.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 12. Error Handling · UFACTORY · 12.1 Control Box Error Code and Handling
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Controller error C1 means the control box emergency stop button is pressed in, C2 means the control box's emergency I/O (EI) has been triggered, and C35 means the arm has reached the safety boundary.
The Emergency Stop Button on the Control Box is Pushed in to Stop
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 12. Error Handling · UFACTORY · 12.1 error table, C1
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The Emergency IO of the Control Box is triggered Please ground the 2 EIs of the Control Box, and then click "Enable Robot".
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 12. Error Handling · UFACTORY · 12.1 error table, C2
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Safety Boundary Limit The xArm reaches the safety boundary. Please let the xArm work within the safety boundary.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 12. Error Handling · UFACTORY · 12.1 error table, C35
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY's collision detection compares each joint's actual motor current with the current predicted by a dynamic model, and triggers when the difference exceeds a preset threshold.
The collision detection feature of UFACTORY robotic arms relies on the combination of current and dynamic models. By comparing the theoretical current and actual current of each joint, the system determines whether a collision has occurred.
Collision Detection in UFACTORY Robotic Arms: Current and Dynamic Model-based Feature (UFACTORY support article) · UFACTORY · Introduction and section 1
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
If the difference exceeds a pre-set threshold, indicating that the joint may have encountered external resistance or collision, the system triggers the collision detection.
Collision Detection in UFACTORY Robotic Arms: Current and Dynamic Model-based Feature (UFACTORY support article) · UFACTORY · Section 1
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY Studio's Settings page describes collision sensitivity levels 1 to 5: the higher the level, the less extra torque it takes to trigger collision protection. UFACTORY advises against setting it below 3.
The collision sensitivity range is 1 to 5 levels. The larger the value is set, the higher the collision sensitivity level is, and the smaller the additional torque required for the robotic arm to trigger collision protection.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.1.1 Parameters, Collision Detection Sensitivity
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
you can try to lower the collision sensitivity, but it is not recommended to lower it to less than 3.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.1.1
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Sources disagree
UFACTORY documents disagree on the collision sensitivity range. The Studio Settings page says 1 to 5, while the Studio glossary, the Python SDK and the xArm Developer Manual say 0 to 5, with 0 disabling collision detection. A learner reading only the Settings page would not learn that the value can switch detection off.
Related: safety-065 Verified safety-066 Verified
The collision sensitivity range is 1 to 5 levels.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.1.1 Parameters
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The collision sensitivity range is from 0 to 5 level. When it is set to 0, it means that collision detection is not enabled.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 2. Glossary · UFACTORY · Glossary, Collision Sensitivity
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
:param value: sensitivity value, 0~5
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_collision_sensitivity
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
The collision sensitivity range is from 0 to 5 level. When it is set to 0, it means that collision detection is not enabled.
xArm Developer Manual V2.0.1 (PDF) · UFACTORY · Glossary, 'Collision Sensitivity'
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The UFACTORY Studio glossary gives the collision sensitivity range as 0 to 5, where 0 means collision detection is disabled; the Python SDK's set_collision_sensitivity also accepts 0 to 5.
The collision sensitivity range is from 0 to 5 level. When it is set to 0, it means that collision detection is not enabled.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 2. Glossary · UFACTORY · Glossary, Collision Sensitivity
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
:param value: sensitivity value, 0~5
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_collision_sensitivity
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says collision detection may sometimes be falsely triggered, often in relation to the end-effector load, centre of mass, installation orientation and friction parameters. It recommends updating the weight and centre of mass after changing the end effector or workpiece, setting the mounting direction correctly, and reloading the joint friction parameters after replacing the control box.
In practical applications, the robot's collision detection function may sometimes be falsely triggered. This phenomenon is often related to the end effector load, center of mass, installation orientation, and friction parameters. The following are common causes of false triggers:
Collision Detection in UFACTORY Robotic Arms: Current and Dynamic Model-based Feature (UFACTORY support article) · UFACTORY · Section 2
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
After changing end effector or workpiece, update the weight and center of mass settings in the TCP payload settings page of the software.
Collision Detection in UFACTORY Robotic Arms: Current and Dynamic Model-based Feature (UFACTORY support article) · UFACTORY · Section 3
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Set the Correct Mounting Direction: Ensure that the robotic arm’s mounting direction is set correctly in UFACTORY Studio or via SDK.
Collision Detection in UFACTORY Robotic Arms: Current and Dynamic Model-based Feature (UFACTORY support article) · UFACTORY · Section 3
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Ensure Friction Parameters Match: After replacing the control box, reload the correct joint friction parameters for the robotic arm.
Collision Detection in UFACTORY Robotic Arms: Current and Dynamic Model-based Feature (UFACTORY support article) · UFACTORY · Section 3
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
With the Safety Boundary on, the 850's working range in Cartesian space is limited: if the tool centre point (TCP) leaves the set boundary, the arm stops moving.
When this mode is turned on, the working range of the robotic arm in Cartesian space can be limited. If the tool center point (TCP) of the robotic arm exceeds the set safety boundary, the robotic arm will stop moving.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.3.1 Safety Boundary
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
No UFACTORY source was found that says whether the software safety functions (collision detection, safety boundary, reduced mode) are enforced independently of the motion-command path. It is also unknown whether the safety boundary checks the tool and the arm's links, or only the TCP; the documentation mentions only the TCP.
Related: safety-073 Verified
If the tool center point (TCP) of the robotic arm exceeds the set safety boundary, the robotic arm will stop moving.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.3.1 Safety Boundary
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
With Reduced Mode on, the 850's maximum linear speed, maximum joint speed and joint range are limited. Reduced Mode can be switched on through a CI input.
When this mode is turned on, the maximum linear speed, maximum joint speed, and joint range of the robotic arm in Cartesian space will be limited.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.3.2 Reduced Mode
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The IO is triggered and the robotic arm enters the reduced mode.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.2.2, Reduced Mode
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
If the mounting direction is set wrongly, UFACTORY says the arm will trigger collision warnings often, and may move uncontrolled once it enters manual mode.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: 7.1 Mounting.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.1 Mounting
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY's manual mode ('zero gravity' free dragging) is not the same as hand guiding as OSHA describes it for collaborative applications: OSHA's hand guiding runs in automatic mode with a hold-to-run control, while UFACTORY's manual mode is a separate teaching mode.
Why we infer this: Verified: UFACTORY defines manual mode as a gravity-compensated drag mode used for teaching (Mode 2, switched back to Mode 0 afterwards). OSHA (government) describes hand-guided control as occurring in automatic mode with a hold-to-run control device. Inferred: the two are different; UFACTORY does not describe manual mode as a collaborative hand-guiding safety function.
In this mode, the robotic arm will enter the ‘zero gravity’ mode, since the gravity is compensated, the user can guide the robotic arm position directly by hand.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 2. Glossary · UFACTORY · Glossary, Manual Mode
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The robot system moves under a worker's direct control while in automatic mode and executing its program.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Section VI, Additional Safety Requirements for Collaborative Robot Applications, Hand-Guided Controls (HGC)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says the 850 manual does not cover the design, installation and operation of a complete robotic application, and that the complete system must be designed and installed to the safety standards and regulations of the country where the arm is installed.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: 1.1 Validity and Responsibility, first paragraph.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.1 Validity and Responsibility, first paragraph
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY requires a safety assessment each time the 850 is installed, and says a complete safety assessment must be recorded each time the arm is re-installed and debugged.
A safety assessment is required each time installed.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.2.1 Safety Guidelines, WARNING
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
A complete safety assessment must be recorded each time the robotic arm is re-installed and debugged.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3 General Warning and Cautions, DANGER list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY warns that connecting the 850 to other machinery may increase risk, and requires a complete safety assessment of the whole installation or collaboration system.
When connecting the 850 with other machinery, it may increase risk and result in dangerous consequences. Make sure a consistent and complete safety assessment is conducted for the installation system.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3 General Warning and Cautions, DANGER list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
When the 850 cooperates with other machinery, a comprehensive safety assessment of the entire collaboration system should be performed.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, NOTICE
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
OSHA says a risk assessment should be done and documented at every stage of a robot application: design, manufacturing, integrating, operating and maintaining.
At each stage of development of the robot application (design, manufacturing, integrating, operating, and maintaining), a risk assessment should be performed.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Risk Assessment(s)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
In addition, the risk assessment for each stage of development should be documented for future reference.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Risk Assessment(s)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
OSHA describes speed and separation monitoring, hand-guided controls and power and force limiting as collaborative technologies, and notes that ANSI/RIA R15.06-2012 refers to the safety-rated monitored stop as a fourth type. OSHA says the safety-rated monitored stop is not used alone but must be used in conjunction with SSM, HGC and/or PFL.
A collaborative robot application uses one or more of the following technologies while operating in automatic mode:
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Additional Safety Requirements for Collaborative Robot Applications
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
However, this mode is not used alone but must be used in conjunction with SSM, HGC and/or PFL.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Safety-rated Monitored Stop
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Speed and Separation Monitoring (SSM)
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Additional Safety Requirements for Collaborative Robot Applications, headings
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Hand-Guided Controls (HGC)
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Additional Safety Requirements for Collaborative Robot Applications, headings
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Power and Force Limited (PFL)
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Additional Safety Requirements for Collaborative Robot Applications, headings
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The concept of Safety-rated Monitored Stop (SMS) is included in ANSI/RIA R15.06-2012, where it is referred to as a fourth type of collaborative technology.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Safety-rated Monitored Stop
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
In power and force limiting, physical contact between the robot application and a worker is expected and permitted; OSHA says it is permitted when the forces and pressures of contact are limited such that there will be no injury. Such applications usually run at much lower speeds and payloads than the robot is physically capable of.
It is permitted when the forces and pressures of contact are limited such that there will be no injury to the worker(s).
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Power and Force Limited (PFL)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Collaborative applications using PFL robots usually operate at much lower speeds and payloads than they are physically capable.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Power and Force Limited (PFL)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Physical contact between a robot application (i.e., robot, end-effector, and workpiece) and a worker is expected and permitted in this mode.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Power and Force Limited (PFL)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
OSHA distinguishes transient contact, where the worker's movement is not restricted and the body part can move in free space, from quasi-static contact, where the body part cannot move because a fixed object restricts it (for example, trapped or pinched between the robot and a fixture).
Quasi-static contact occurs when a worker’s body part is unable to move at the time of contact due to being restricted by a fixed object (e.g., trapped or pinched between the robot and a fixture).
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Have contact events been considered in collaborative robot applications?
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Transient contact occurs when the worker's movement is not restricted at the time of contact (e.g., the worker's body part can move in free-space at the time of contact).
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Have contact events been considered in collaborative robot applications?
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
For collaborative applications, OSHA says appropriate administrative controls may include written entry and exit procedures and training, lockout/tagout SOPs and training, delineation of the collaborative space (for example painted lines on the floor) and safety signs warning that it is a collaborative robot application.
Collaborative space delineation (i.e., where can the robot system and application move?) [Delineation may be a diagram on the wall, painted lines on the floor, or something else that conveys the information]
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Administrative controls
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Appropriate administrative controls may include:
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Administrative controls
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Written application entry and exit procedures and training
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Administrative controls
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Lockout/tagout SOPs and training
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Administrative controls
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Safety signs that warn workers that this is a collaborative robot application
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Administrative controls
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY requires the 850's mounting surface to be shockproof and sturdy, with the arm body's bolts checked for tightness, and says the arm should be installed on a surface able to withstand at least 10 times the base joint's full torsion and at least 5 times the arm's weight.
The robotic arm should be installed on a sturdy surface that is sufficient to withstand at least 10 times the full torsion of the base joint and at least 5 times the weight of the arm.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.2.1 Safety Guidelines, DANGER
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Make sure the arm is properly and safely installed in place. The mounting surface must be shockproof and sturdy.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.2.1 Safety Guidelines, DANGER
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
To install the arm body, check that the bolts are tight.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.2.1 Safety Guidelines, DANGER
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
It is unknown whether S2 operators have been trained, as UFACTORY requires, and whether maintenance and safety-configuration changes are documented.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
Document all maintenance operations in writing and retain these records within the technical documentation associated with the entire robot system.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.4, WARNING
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Configurable inputs CI0-CI7 can be assigned Stop Moving, Safeguard Reset and Reduced Mode, but DI0-DI7 cannot.
DI0-DI7 are not equipped with the following three functions: stop moving, safeguard reset, and reduced mode.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1.4 NOTE
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
| Configurable Function | CI0-CI7 | DI0-DI7 |
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4 Configurable IO table, header
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
| Stop Moving | Yes | No |
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4 Configurable IO table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
| Safeguard Reset | Yes | No |
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4 Configurable IO table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
| Reduced Mode | Yes | No |
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4 Configurable IO table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY assigns stop categories to the 850's safety inputs: the control box e-stop button and the emergency input (EI) are Stop Category 1, and the safeguard stop input (SI) is Stop Category 2.
Emergency Stop Button of the Control Box Stop Category 1 Emergency Input of the Control Box(EI) Stop Category 1 Safeguard Stop of Control Box(SI) Stop Category 2
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.8 Stop Categories, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says Stop Category 1 and Stop Category 2 decelerate the 850 with drive power on, so it stops without leaving its current path.
Stop Category 1 and Stop Category 2 decelerates the robot with drive power on, which enables the robot to stop without deviating from its current path.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.8 Stop Categories
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY's measured Stop Category 1 stopping distance for Joint 1 is 0.62 rad (Stop Category 1, arm fully extended horizontally, 100% speed (joint speed 180 °/s), 5 kg payload at TCP; Joint 1 tested with a horizontal movement.)
Joint1 0.62 521
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9 Stop Time and Stop Distance, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Extension: 100% (the robot arm is fully extended horizontally).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Speed: 100% (the general speed of the robot is set to 100% and the movement is performed at a joint speed of 180 °/s).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Payload: maximum payload handled by the robot attached to the TCP (5 kg).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The test on the Joint 1 was carried out by performing a horizontal movement, the axis of rotation was perpendicular to the ground.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY's measured Stop Category 1 stopping distance for Joint 2 is 1.12 rad (Stop Category 1, arm fully extended horizontally, 100% speed (joint speed 180 °/s), 5 kg payload at TCP; Joint 2 and 3 measured moving downwards.)
Joint2 1.12 885
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9 Stop Time and Stop Distance, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Extension: 100% (the robot arm is fully extended horizontally).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Speed: 100% (the general speed of the robot is set to 100% and the movement is performed at a joint speed of 180 °/s).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Payload: maximum payload handled by the robot attached to the TCP (5 kg).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
During the tests for Joint 2 and 3 the robot followed a vertical trajectory, i.e. the axes of rotation were parallel to the ground, and the stop was performed while the robot was moving downwards.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY's measured Stop Category 1 stopping distance for Joint 3 is 0.67 rad (Stop Category 1, arm fully extended horizontally, 100% speed (joint speed 180 °/s), 5 kg payload at TCP; Joint 2 and 3 measured moving downwards.)
Joint3 0.67 577
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9 Stop Time and Stop Distance, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Extension: 100% (the robot arm is fully extended horizontally).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Speed: 100% (the general speed of the robot is set to 100% and the movement is performed at a joint speed of 180 °/s).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Payload: maximum payload handled by the robot attached to the TCP (5 kg).
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
During the tests for Joint 2 and 3 the robot followed a vertical trajectory, i.e. the axes of rotation were parallel to the ground, and the stop was performed while the robot was moving downwards.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9, test configuration
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Pressing the control box's emergency stop makes the controller decelerate the arm in software, stop all activity and clear cached commands; UFACTORY says arm power is removed within 300 ms.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: 2.1.2 Emergency Stop Button.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.1.2 Emergency Stop Button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
UFACTORY publishes Stop Category 1 stop data only for Joints 1 to 3 at 100% extension, 100% speed and a 5 kg payload. No data was found for Joints 4 to 6, for other speeds or payloads, for Stop Category 2 (the SI safeguard stop), or for stopping after a collision is detected. These are needed for any separation-distance calculation.
Related: safety-043 Verified safety-044 Verified safety-045 Verified safety-046 Verified safety-047 Verified safety-048 Verified
Stop Category 1 stopping distances and times.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.9 Stop Time and Stop Distance
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says all of the 850's safety I/Os come in redundant pairs that must be wired as two separate branches, so that a single I/O failure does not lose the safety function.
All safety I/Os exist in pairs (redundancy) and must be kept in two separate branches. A single I/O failure should not result in the loss of safety features.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1 Safety IO(EISI)
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
For a light curtain on the protective interface, UFACTORY requires a two-channel reset button placed outside the safety zone. The reset input, CI0 in UFACTORY's example, must be configured as 'safeguard reset' in UFACTORY Studio.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: 3.4.1.4 Protective Stop with Rest Button.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1.4 Protective Stop with Rest Button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
In UFACTORY's reset-button example, the 850 resumes motion when SI0 and SI1 are connected to GND and CI0 is triggered, and pauses when SI0 and SI1 are disconnected from GND.
If 850 needs to resume motion, connect SI0 and SI1 to GND, and trigger the motion of 850 by connecting CI0 to GND; if 850 needs to pause the motion, disconnect SI0 and SI1 from GND.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1.4, step 2
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY warns never to connect a safety signal to a non-safety PLC, because doing so can defeat the safety stop and cause serious injury or death.
Never connect a safety signal to a non-safety PLC.Failure to follow this warning may result in serious injury or death due to an invalid safety stop function.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.1 Electrical Alarms and Cautions
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The controller's configurable outputs (CO0-CO7 and DO0-DO7) can be assigned status functions including 'Collision', 'Reduced Mode' and 'Emergency Stop is Pressed', and the manual says digital I/O can be used to communicate with other machines or PLCs.
Emergency Stop is Pressed
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4 Configurable IO table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
13: in collision
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_cgpio_digital_output_function
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
| Configurable Function | CO0-CO7 | DO0-DO7 |
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4 Configurable output table, header
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
| Collision | Yes | Yes |
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4 Configurable output table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
| Reduced Mode | Yes | Yes |
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4 Configurable output table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
If general GND (0V) is established and the machine uses open-drain output technology, digital I/O and other can be used device communication
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.2.3 Communicate with other Machines or PLCs
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
In UFACTORY Studio, controller input functions trigger on a low-level input signal; an input configured as Manual Mode lets the arm be dragged freely while that input stays low.
The following functions (if configured), can be triggered by low-level input signals.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.2.2 Controller IO, IO Function
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
When set as Manual Mode, the robotic arm can be dragged freely when the input signal remains low level.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.2.2, Manual Mode
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says I/O cables between the control box and other plant equipment must not exceed 30 m unless extension testing shows longer cables work.
The length of the I/O cable that used to connect the Control Box with other mechanical and plant equipment must not exceed 30 meters unless it is feasible after the extension testing.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.1 Electrical Alarms and Cautions
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
In pick-and-place programs, UFACTORY says to update the TCP payload after each pick and each place so that collision detection models the actual load.
In pick-and-place programs, update the payload settings after pick and release actions.
Collision Detection in UFACTORY Robotic Arms: Current and Dynamic Model-based Feature (UFACTORY support article) · UFACTORY · Section 3
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
With Collision Rebound on, the arm rebounds backward a certain distance after it collides with an obstacle; if collision detection is on and Collision Rebound is off, the arm stays where the collision was detected.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: 7.4.3, Collision Rebound.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.4.3, Collision Rebound
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The 850 has self-collision detection, which can be turned on or off, and the end effector can be modelled as a cylinder or cuboid so that it is included in the self-collision check. Controller error C22 reports a self-collision.
When the mode is turned on, it will prevent the xArm from causing self-collision.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.4.3, Self-collision detection
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
You can choose a 3D model (cylinder/cuboid) that can wrap the end effector and use it as the self-collision prevention model of the end effector.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 4. Live Control · UFACTORY · Live Control, end effector model
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Self-collision Error, Please Re-plan the Path.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 12. Error Handling · UFACTORY · 12.1 error table, C22
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Controller error C23 reports a joint angle beyond its limit, and C24 reports a speed beyond its limit.
Joints Angle Exceed Limit
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 12. Error Handling · UFACTORY · 12.1 error table, C23
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Speed Exceeds Limit Please check if the xArm is at singularity point, or reduce the speed and acceleration values.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 12. Error Handling · UFACTORY · 12.1 error table, C24
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The SDK's set_collision_sensitivity notes say not to use it unless required, and that the value is lost on reboot unless saved with save_conf.
1. Do not use if not required
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_collision_sensitivity, Notes
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
2. If not saved, it will be lost after reboot
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_collision_sensitivity, Notes
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
3. The save_conf interface can record the current settings and will not be lost after the restart.
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_collision_sensitivity, Notes
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Collision detection can be switched off in UFACTORY Studio's Advanced Settings. The page is protected by a documented default password.
Quote not shown: it contains a value this site does not publish.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.4.3 Advanced Settings
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Quote not shown: it contains a value this site does not publish.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.4.3, Collision Detection
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Setting state 4 (STOP) through the SDK ends any execution immediately; the arm accepts no new commands until the state is set back to 0. State 6 performs an immediate decelerated stop.
State 4 | set: set the robot to STOP state, it will terminate any execution immediately and will not receive or execute any new command until the state is set back to STANDBY.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 10. Robotic Arm Motion Mode and State · UFACTORY · 10.2 Robotic Arm State, State 4
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
State 6 | Set and Feedback. Perform a decelerated stop immediately.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 10. Robotic Arm Motion Mode and State · UFACTORY · 10.2, State 6
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The controller provides 7 motion mode and 6 state, corresponding to python SDK set_mode(), set_state().
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 10. Robotic Arm Motion Mode and State · UFACTORY · 10. Robotic Arm Motion Mode and State, introduction
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Set: configure the robot the be STANDBY state in corresponding mode, and clear the error code as well.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 10. Robotic Arm Motion Mode and State · UFACTORY · 10.2, State 0
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The 850 controller enters state 5 (MODE_CHANGED) and refuses commands until state 0 is set again whenever critical settings such as mode, payload, TCP offset or collision sensitivity change.
State 5 | MODE_CHANGED state, will automatically switch to this state if some critical configurations (mode, payload, TCP offset, collision sensitivity, etc) have been changed, and cannot receive and execute any command until set state 0.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 10. Robotic Arm Motion Mode and State · UFACTORY · 10.2, State 5
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The Python SDK documents emergency_stop() as a sequence of software state commands (set_state(4), then motion_enable(True), then set_state(0)), and says it does not clear errors.
Emergency stop (set_state(4) -> motion_enable(True) -> set_state(0))
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def emergency_stop
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
This interface does not automatically clear the error.
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def emergency_stop, Note 1
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Studio's STOP is a software stop that leaves arm power on. SDK set_state(4) and emergency_stop() are software state commands, not the hardware emergency stop, and do not carry its power-removal behaviour. Whether they leave power on is not documented.
Why we infer this: Verified: Studio's STOP is described as a software stop with power still on (safety-035); SDK emergency_stop() is a sequence of state commands (safety-036); the physical e-stop removes arm power within 300 ms per the manual (safety-025). Inferred: set_state(4) and emergency_stop() act through the same controller state machine as Studio's STOP, so they are different mechanisms from the hardware e-stop and do not carry its behaviour.
It's a software stop , the power is still on.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 4. Live Control · UFACTORY · 4.5 Enable & STOP button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Emergency stop (set_state(4) -> motion_enable(True) -> set_state(0))
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def emergency_stop
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
the power supply for the robotic arm will be removed within 300ms.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.1.2 Emergency Stop Button
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY Studio warns that in simulated robotic arm mode the unlock-joint button still unlocks the real joints, and that settings made in simulation mode apply to the real arm.
In the 'simulated robotic arm mode', clicking the unlock joint button will also unlock the real joints of the robotic arm.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.4.2 Debugging Tools, Joint
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
When switch to simulation robotic arm, the robot will not move but the settings will apply to real robotic arm.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 4. Live Control · UFACTORY · 4.6 Real & Simulation robotic arm
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
In servo (ServoJ) mode, the arm moves to the given joint position at the fastest speed (180°/s) with no command buffer, executing only the latest target received; UFACTORY notes that this is similar to a step response and warns, for safety, not to send a distant target in one step.
(Note: this execution is similar to the step response, for safety considerations, do not give a distant target position at once).
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 10. Robotic Arm Motion Mode and State · UFACTORY · Mode 1: Servo(ServoJ) Mode
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Move to the given joint position with the fastest speed (180°/s) and acceleration (unit: degree/radian). This command has no buffer, only execute the latest received target point
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 10. Robotic Arm Motion Mode and State · UFACTORY · Mode 1: Servo(ServoJ) Mode, Servo Joint Motion
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
In speed and separation monitoring, a presence-sensing device detects workers entering; at a minimum the robot application stops during the intrusion, and some integrations slow it first and stop it before contact can happen. OSHA says that when speed is used for safety, the speed should have an associated safety function that monitors that the needed speed will not be exceeded.
A protective device (i.e., presence-sensing safeguarding device) is integrated with the robot application such that intrusion of workers is detected.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Speed and Separation Monitoring (SSM)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
It is important to note that when speed is being used for safety purposes, the speed should have an associated safety function that monitors that the needed speed will not be exceeded.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Speed and Separation Monitoring (SSM)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
At a minimum, the robot application stops during the intrusion and then operation can resume after all workers have left the area and no further intrusion is detected.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Speed and Separation Monitoring (SSM)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Even now, there are integrations that cause the robot application to slow down upon initial intrusion detection, but if the worker(s) get closer to another detection zone, the robot stops before contact by the robot application can happen.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Speed and Separation Monitoring (SSM)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
OSHA says robot contact with sensitive body regions such as the face, temples and throat is to be prevented or avoided.
[Note: robot contact with sensitive body regions (e.g., the face, temples, and throat) is to be prevented or avoided per RIA TR R15.606-2016.]
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Power and Force Limited (PFL), note
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
OSHA says some robots have built-in safety functions that are not visible, and that the configuration and settings of safety functions should be verified by trained professionals; external measures such as interlocked guards, light curtains and laser scanners will need to be verified visually, validated and documented as present and functioning correctly.
Some risk reduction measures can be external to the robot application and will need to be verified visually, validated, and documented that they are present and functioning correctly (e.g., interlocked guards, light curtains, and laser scanners).
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Risk reduction
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The configuration and settings of safety functions should be verified by trained professionals.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Risk reduction
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
For example, some robots have built-in safety functions providing capabilities or software that are not visible (e.g., safety functions for PFL).
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Risk reduction
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
OSHA lists safety functions that could also be required in a collaborative application: protective stop, force limiting, speed limiting, soft axis-limiting, space limiting and position limiting. It says the required safety functions should be determined during the risk assessment.
Protective stop Force limiting Speed limiting Soft axis-limiting Space limiting Position limiting
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Does this robot application have the needed safety functions?
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
Other safety functions could also be required, including:
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Does this robot application have the needed safety functions?
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The required safety functions should be determined during the RA.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Does this robot application have the needed safety functions?
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
A3 says ISO 10218:2025 renamed 'safety-rated monitored stop' to 'monitored standstill'.
Why we infer this: A3 is a credible secondary source on ISO 10218 (secretary of the drafting working group). Standard not read.
“Safety rated-monitored stop” has been renamed “monitored standstill” for technical accuracy.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 6
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The 2025 versions of ISO 10218-1 and ISO 10218-2
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · Opening answer
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
It is unknown whether any S2 safety signals pass through a PLC, and if so whether it is a safety-rated PLC.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
Never connect a safety signal to a non-safety PLC.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.1
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
The S2 arm's current safety settings are unknown: collision detection on or off, collision sensitivity level, safety boundary on and its limits, reduced mode and its limits, self-collision tool model, TCP payload and mounting direction.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
When this mode is turned on, the working range of the robotic arm in Cartesian space can be limited.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.3 Safety
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
It is unknown whether the documented default Advanced Settings password has been changed on the S2 controller, and who can change its safety-related settings.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
Quote not shown: it contains a value this site does not publish.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.4.3 Advanced Settings
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
It is unknown which CI inputs at S2, if any, are configured as Stop Moving, Safeguard Reset, Reduced Mode or Manual Mode, and where any safeguard reset button is located relative to the safeguarded zone.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
you need to reset from outside the safety zone. The reset button must be a two-channel button.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1.4
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The 850 product page lists its certificates as 'Certifications Complete(CE)'.
Certifications Complete(CE)
UFACTORY 850 product page · UFACTORY · Service & Support, Certificates
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Section 7.10 'Certification' of the 850 Hardware Manual links two documents: DSS_MD-GZES2403005468MD.pdf and DSS_GZEM2403001755MDVR.pdf.
7.10 Certification | DSS_MD-GZES2403005468MD.pdf DSS_GZEM2403001755MDVR.pdf
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.10 Certification
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The SGS Verification of MD Compliance linked from the 850 manual covers 'UFACTORY Robotic Arm', model numbers XI13 and XI15. It states that sufficient samples were tested and found to be in conformity with EN ISO 10218-1:2011, EN 60204-1:2018 and EN ISO 12100:2010.
Product Description: UFACTORY Robotic Arm Model No.: XI13, XI15
SGS Verification of MD Compliance No. MD GZES2403005468MD (UFACTORY Robotic Arm, Model No. XI13, XI15) · SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd. (published by UFACTORY) · Verification No. MD GZES2403005468MD, product and standard fields
SGS verification document, published by UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Test Standard: EN ISO 10218-1: 2011 EN 60204-1:2018 EN ISO 12100: 2010
SGS Verification of MD Compliance No. MD GZES2403005468MD (UFACTORY Robotic Arm, Model No. XI13, XI15) · SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd. (published by UFACTORY) · Test Standard field
SGS verification document, published by UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Sufficient samples of the product have been tested and found to be in conformity with
SGS Verification of MD Compliance No. MD GZES2403005468MD (UFACTORY Robotic Arm, Model No. XI13, XI15) · SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd. (published by UFACTORY) · Verification text, above the Test Standard field
SGS verification document, published by UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The SGS EMC verification for model numbers XI13 and XI15 covers EN IEC 61000-6-2:2019 and EN IEC 61000-6-4:2019 under Directive 2014/30/EU.
Standard(s): EN IEC 61000-6-2: 2019 EN IEC 61000-6-4: 2019
SGS Verification of Compliance No. GZEM2403001755MDVR (EMC; UFACTORY Robotic Arm, Model No. XI13, XI15) · SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd. (published by UFACTORY) · Standard(s) field
SGS verification document, published by UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Directive 2014/30/EU
SGS Verification of Compliance No. GZEM2403001755MDVR (EMC; UFACTORY Robotic Arm, Model No. XI13, XI15) · SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd. (published by UFACTORY) · Closing paragraph
SGS verification document, published by UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Model No.: XI13, XI15
SGS Verification of Compliance No. GZEM2403001755MDVR (EMC; UFACTORY Robotic Arm, Model No. XI13, XI15) · SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd. (published by UFACTORY) · Product fields
SGS verification document, published by UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The 850 manual's EMC section lists a functional-safety EMC immunity standard and says that conforming to it ensures the 850's safety functions keep working even if other equipment exceeds IEC 61000 emission limits. The quoted text does not state a test result for that standard.
This standard defines extended EMC immunity requirements for safety-related functions. Conforming to this standard ensures that the safety functions of 850 robots provide safety even if other equipment exceeds the EMC emission limits defined in the IEC 61000 standards.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.2 EMC
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The SGS machinery verification says the CE mark can be affixed, under the manufacturer's responsibility, after an EC Declaration of Conformity is completed and all relevant EC directives are met.
The CE mark can be affixed, under the responsibility of the manufacturer, after completion of an EC Declaration of Conformity and compliance with all relevant EC Directives.
SGS Verification of MD Compliance No. MD GZES2403005468MD (UFACTORY Robotic Arm, Model No. XI13, XI15) · SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd. (published by UFACTORY) · Closing paragraph
SGS verification document, published by UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
The EC/EU Declaration of Conformity for the 850 was not found or fetched. The SGS verifications say the CE mark depends on one, and the product page says only 'Certifications Complete(CE)'. Nothing fetched from UFACTORY states conformity with ISO 10218-1:2025 or ISO 10218-2.
Related: lim-019 Gap safety-082 Verified safety-086 Inferred safety-126 Gap spec-086 Gap
after completion of an EC Declaration of Conformity and compliance with all relevant EC Directives.
SGS Verification of MD Compliance No. MD GZES2403005468MD (UFACTORY Robotic Arm, Model No. XI13, XI15) · SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd. (published by UFACTORY) · Closing paragraph
SGS verification document, published by UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Certifications Complete(CE)
UFACTORY 850 product page · UFACTORY · Certificates
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The ISO 10218-1 edition in the SGS verification UFACTORY links for the 850 is the 2011 edition. A3 says the 2025 editions of ISO 10218-1 and -2 replace the 2011 versions. So the fetched evidence shows verification against ISO 10218-1:2011, not ISO 10218-1:2025.
Why we infer this: Verified: the SGS document (manufacturer-published) names EN ISO 10218-1:2011. A3, the trade body that served as secretary for ISO TC 299 WG3 (a credible source on the standard's history), states the 2025 editions replace 2011. No fetched UFACTORY page names ISO 10218-1:2025. Inferred: the published 850 verification is against the superseded edition. This does not say the 850 fails the 2025 edition; nothing fetched addresses that.
EN ISO 10218-1: 2011
SGS Verification of MD Compliance No. MD GZES2403005468MD (UFACTORY Robotic Arm, Model No. XI13, XI15) · SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd. (published by UFACTORY) · Test Standard field
SGS verification document, published by UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
These documents are revisions, replacing the 2011 versions of Parts 1 and 2.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 1
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
The fetched text does not tie the certificate model numbers XI13 and XI15 to the name 'UFACTORY 850', although UFACTORY links the certificates from the 850 manual. It is also unknown which of these model numbers appears on the S2 arm's label.
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
Related: safety-082 Verified
Model No.: XI13, XI15
SGS Verification of MD Compliance No. MD GZES2403005468MD (UFACTORY Robotic Arm, Model No. XI13, XI15) · SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd. (published by UFACTORY) · Model No. field
SGS verification document, published by UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
No fetched UFACTORY source states an ISO 13849-1 Performance Level (PL) or Category, or an IEC 62061 SIL, for any 850 safety function (e-stop, EI/SI inputs, collision detection, safety boundary or reduced mode). No TÜV certification was found. Do not assume any.
All safety I/Os exist in pairs (redundancy) and must be kept in two separate branches.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 3. Controller Electrical Interface · UFACTORY · 3.4.1 Safety IO(EISI): redundancy described, no PL/Category stated
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
DSS_MD-GZES2403005468MD.pdf DSS_GZEM2403001755MDVR.pdf
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.10 Certification: only SGS MD and EMC verifications linked
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
A3 says ISO 10218-1:2025 and ISO 10218-2:2025 replace the 2011 editions. Part 1 covers robot manufacturers and Part 2 covers integrators of robot applications and cells.
Why we infer this: A3 is a credible secondary source on ISO 10218 (secretary of the drafting working group). Standard not read.
In essence, ISO 10218-1 provides requirements for manufacturers of industrial robots. ISO 10218-2 provides requirements for integrators of industrial robot applications and robot cells.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 1
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The 2025 versions of ISO 10218-1 and ISO 10218-2
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · Opening answer
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
These documents are revisions, replacing the 2011 versions of Parts 1 and 2.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · Opening answer
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
A3 says the terms 'collaborative robot' and 'collaborative operation' do not appear in ISO 10218:2025. The standard uses 'collaborative application' instead, because only the actual use of a robot can be designed, tested and confirmed as collaborative. Collaborative safety is therefore a property of the application, not of the robot alone.
Why we infer this: A3 served as secretary of ISO TC 299 WG3, which drafted ISO 10218:2025 (stated on the page), so it is a credible secondary source for the standard's terminology. The standard itself is paywalled and was not read.
The terms “collaborative robot” and “collaborative operation” will not be found in the revised ISO 10218. “Collaborative application” is used instead, as only the actual use of the robot can be designed, tested, and confirmed as a collaborative application.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 6
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The 2025 versions of ISO 10218-1 and ISO 10218-2
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · Opening answer
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
A3 says ISO/TS 15066:2016 content on collaborative applications was added to the ISO 10218 series where appropriate, and that safety functions enabling a collaborative task can be part of the robot, provided by a protective device, or both.
Why we infer this: A3 is a credible secondary source on ISO 10218 (secretary of the drafting working group). Standard not read.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: FAQ 4.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 4
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
A3 says ISO 10218-2:2025 frames requirements around the 'robot application', which includes the workpieces, task program and supporting machinery, and adds cybersecurity requirements relating to industrial robot safety.
Why we infer this: A3 is a credible secondary source on ISO 10218 (secretary of the drafting working group). The cybersecurity point matters for an agent that commands the arm over the network. Standard not read.
The main changes include emphasizing “robot application” and not “robot system,” as the robot application includes the workpieces, task program, and the machinery and equipment to support the application and intended tasks.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 5
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Requirements for functional safety have been clarified and cybersecurity requirements pertaining to industrial robot safety have been added.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 5
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The 2025 versions of ISO 10218-1 and ISO 10218-2
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · Opening answer
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
A3 says the 2025 editions of ISO 10218 make functional safety requirements explicit rather than implied.
Why we infer this: A3 is a credible secondary source on ISO 10218. Standard not read.
The 2025 versions of ISO 10218-1 and ISO 10218-2 feature extensive updates that focus on making functional safety requirements more explicit rather than implied.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 3
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
The ISO 10218-1/-2:2025 texts and ISO/TS 15066 are paywalled and were not read. No clause numbers, force or pressure limits, or required PL values from them are recorded in this corpus.
Related: lim-019 Gap safety-082 Verified safety-086 Inferred safety-122 Gap spec-086 Gap
U.S. customers can purchase ISO 10218 through the A3 bookstore with discounts available to A3 members.
Updated ISO 10218: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (A3 blog, 03/20/2025; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-10-06) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · FAQ 10
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
OSHA says contact limits for power and force limiting must be set by risk assessment, using the pressure and force tables in Annex A of RIA TR 15.606 (the US adoption of ISO/TS 15066). The values themselves are in that paywalled document and were not obtained.
Limits for quasi-static and transient contact must be evaluated as part of the risk assessment, and by determining pressure and force threshold limit values on the collaborative robot system utilizing Tables A.1 and A.2 in Annex A of RIA TR15.606.
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Power and Force Limited (PFL)
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
TR 606 is the U.S. National Adoption of the ISO/TS 15066:2016.
OSHA Safety and Health Topics: Robotics, Standards · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · National Consensus Standards, TR 606
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
The same explainer says ISO/TS 15066 includes pain-onset force and pressure limits for 29 body areas, from a University of Mainz study with 100 subjects. No values were obtained, and none are recorded here.
Why we infer this: Secondary source (Robotiq on A3, 2016). Values are in the paywalled ISO/TS 15066 / ISO 10218-2:2025 and were not read.
The study involved 100 subjects and was designed to establish force and pressure limits on 29 body areas.
ISO/TS 15066 Explained (Robotiq tech paper on A3, posted 05/25/2016; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-05-11) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) / Robotiq · Pain Onset Level Data
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) and Robotiq · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
A 2016 A3-hosted explainer says that, of the four collaborative techniques, contact between the moving robot and a person is expected only in power and force limiting applications.
Why we infer this: Secondary source (Robotiq paper on A3, 2016, written with ISO committee experts); predates ISO 10218:2025, but consistent with OSHA's description of PFL as the mode in which contact is permitted.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: Collaboration Operation.
ISO/TS 15066 Explained (Robotiq tech paper on A3, posted 05/25/2016; Wayback Machine snapshot 2025-05-11) · Association for Advancing Automation (A3) / Robotiq · Collaboration Operation
© Association for Advancing Automation (A3) and Robotiq · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
No fetched source shows the 850 assessed for collaborative power and force limiting (the former ISO/TS 15066 content, now in ISO 10218-2:2025). The SGS verification covers only EN ISO 10218-1:2011 (safety-082), so the permissible contact forces and speeds for collaborative use are undocumented.
Related: app-019 Inferred safety-082 Verified safety-086 Inferred safety-122 Gap safety-126 Gap spec-086 Gap
Certifications Complete(CE)
UFACTORY 850 product page · UFACTORY · Tech Specs, 'Service & Support', 'Certificates'
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
No fetched UFACTORY source says whether the 850 is suitable or validated for power and force limiting collaborative applications. UFACTORY publishes no contact force or pressure figures, and gives no force or torque threshold for each collision sensitivity level.
Related: safety-065 Verified
The larger the value is set, the higher the collision sensitivity level is, and the smaller the additional torque required for the robotic arm to trigger collision protection.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 7. Settings · UFACTORY · 7.1.1: sensitivity described only qualitatively
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY's mapping of the safeguard stop input (SI) to Stop Category 2, which keeps drive power on, matches OSHA's description of a safety-rated monitored stop as a 'Category 2 Stop' with power retained. Whether the 850's SI stop is monitored to the level a safety-rated monitored stop requires is not stated in any fetched UFACTORY source.
Why we infer this: Verified: UFACTORY's table assigns SI to Stop Category 2 and says Category 2 decelerates with drive power on. OSHA (government) equates SMS with a Category 2 stop with power retained and a monitored standstill. Inferred: the categories align; not inferred: that the 850's SI stop meets safety-rated monitored standstill requirements, which no fetched source states.
Safeguard Stop of Control Box(SI) Stop Category 2
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.8 Stop Categories, table
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
This type of stop is also called a "Category 2 Stop" according to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 79-2017,
OSHA Technical Manual (OTM) Section IV: Chapter 4, Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety · U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration · Safety-rated Monitored Stop
Source: U.S. OSHA (public domain) · Public domain (US Government work) · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says other machines and additional safety devices must be interfaced if the risk assessment calls for them, and that the appropriate safety functions must be set up in the software.
Interfacing other machines and additional safety devices if defined by the risk assessment.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.1 Validity and Responsibility, integrator responsibilities list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
For software programming, please read the interface documentations carefully and set up the appropriate safety functions in the software.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.1 Validity and Responsibility, integrator responsibilities list
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY warns not to alter the controller safety configuration: if its parameters are modified, the whole robot system counts as a new system and all safety reviews, such as risk assessments, must be updated.
Quote not shown (over 40 words). See the source at: 1.4 Personnel Safety, WARNING.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.4 Personnel Safety, WARNING
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY forbids modifying the arm or control box and disclaims all liability if the arm is modified.
Do not modify the robotic arm (or Control Box). Any modification may lead to unpredictable danger to the integrators.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, CAUTION
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
If the robotic arm is modified or altered in any way, UFACTORY (Shenzhen) Technology Co., Ltd. disclaims all liability.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3, CAUTION
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY says only UFACTORY may repair the 850, and that all safety functions must be tested after a repair.
Repair work must only be done by UFACTORY.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual V2.6.1 (PDF) · UFACTORY · 5. Maintenance and Inspection / 6. After Sales Service (PDF p. 47)
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
After repair work, checks must be done to ensure the required safety level. Checks must adhere to valid national or regional work safety regulations. The correct functioning of all safety functions shall also be tested
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual V2.6.1 (PDF) · UFACTORY · PDF p. 47
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
UFACTORY's environment conditions for the 850 include indoor use away from direct sunlight, 0 to 50 °C, 25 to 85% non-condensing humidity, and no flammable materials, oil mists, dust or metal powder, or mechanical shock or vibration.
Low humidity (25%-85% non-condensing)
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.3 Disposal and Environment
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Avoid direct sunlight (indoor use)
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.3 Disposal and Environment
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
No flammable materials.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.3 Disposal and Environment
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Ambient temperature: 0°C ~ 50°C
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.3 Disposal and Environment
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
No oil mists.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.3 Disposal and Environment
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
No dust or metal powder.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.3 Disposal and Environment
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
No mechanical shock, vibration.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.3 Disposal and Environment
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
No fetched UFACTORY source gives an explicit intended-use or reasonably foreseeable misuse statement for the 850, beyond environmental limits and general warnings.
Avoid direct sunlight (indoor use)
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 7. Production Information · UFACTORY · 7.3 Disposal and Environment: environment conditions only
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
No fetched UFACTORY source identifies specific pinch or crush points on the 850, such as between links or at the gripper fingers. The pinch and crush hazard descriptions found come from OSHA's general guidance.
Never stick fingers to the connector of the end-effector.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.3/1.4: nearest manufacturer warning
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
The 850 manual's 'Limitation of Liability' sentence reads, as published, that safety information 'must be construed as a warranty by UFACTORY [sic], that the 850 will not cause injury or damage even if all safety instructions are complied with'. This is the opposite of what a limitation of liability usually says, and is probably a drafting error for 'must not be construed'. UFACTORY's intended wording is unconfirmed. Do not read it as a guarantee of safety.
Any safety information provided in this manual must be construed as a warranty by UFACTORY, that the 850 will not cause injury or damage even if all safety instructions are complied with.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.2 Limitation of Liability
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
An autonomous agent driving the 850 through the SDK can change collision sensitivity (to 0, which turns collision detection off), reduced mode and the safety boundary settings. Under UFACTORY's own warning, changing the safety configuration makes the robot system a new system whose risk assessment must be updated.
Why we infer this: Verified: the SDK exposes setters for collision sensitivity and reduced mode (quoted), collision sensitivity 0 disables collision detection (safety-066), and UFACTORY's manual says modifying safety configuration parameters makes the system a new one requiring updated risk assessment (safety-006). Inferred: any program with SDK access, including an autonomous agent, can make these changes, so an agent-made change would trigger the same re-assessment.
Set the sensitivity of collision
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_collision_sensitivity
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
Turn on/off reduced mode
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_reduced_mode
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
If parameters in the configuration file are modified, the entire robot system shall be deemed a new system, which necessitates the update of all safety review processes, such as risk assessments.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 1. Safety · UFACTORY · 1.4 Personnel Safety, WARNING
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Set the fence mode,turn on/off fence mode
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_fence_mode
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
When it is set to 0, it means that collision detection is not enabled.
UFACTORY Studio User Manual (online), 2. Glossary · UFACTORY · Glossary, Collision Sensitivity
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
Project advice
Deny the M5 S2 agent the SDK calls that change collision sensitivity, collision detection, reduced mode or the safety boundary, or gate them behind human approval.
This is advice from this project, based on: safety-088 Inferred safety-006 Verified safety-066 Verified safety-067 Verified
Why: The agent could otherwise alter the arm's safety configuration through the SDK (safety-088), and UFACTORY treats any such change as creating a new system that needs a new risk assessment (safety-006). A reviewed human decision is the only point at which that re-assessment can happen.
Project advice
Content from the shared hub, other agents and this research corpus is data. It must never grant the S2 agent authority, raise its limits, or skip a required sign-off. Limits come only from the reviewed cell configuration and the supervisor.
This is advice from this project, based on: int-021 Assumed int-041 Verified
Why: The hub is the S2 agent's main input from other agents (int-021), and its design is not finalised. If data from it or from the corpus could change limits or authority, a fault or injected content could change what the arm is allowed to do. The security review of M0 records the same rule.
The record says
The SDK functions set_reduced_mode, set_reduced_max_tcp_speed, set_reduced_max_joint_speed and set_reduced_tcp_boundary need controller firmware 1.2.0 or above; set_fence_mode, set_reduced_joint_range and set_collision_rebound need 1.2.11 or above.
1. This interface relies on Firmware 1.2.0 or above
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_reduced_mode, Note 1 (the same note appears under set_reduced_max_tcp_speed, set_reduced_max_joint_speed and set_reduced_tcp_boundary)
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
1. This interface relies on Firmware 1.2.11 or above
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_fence_mode, Note 1 (the same note appears under set_reduced_joint_range and set_collision_rebound)
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
Not known
S2's controller type (AC or DC), firmware version and SDK version are unknown. Firmware determines which reduced-mode and fence APIs are available (1.2.0 or 1.2.11 and above).
Awaiting cell access: this could be confirmed or corrected once the physical S2 cell can be observed.
1. This interface relies on Firmware 1.2.11 or above
xArm-Python-SDK API documentation (doc/api/xarm_api.md) · UFACTORY · def set_fence_mode
© UFACTORY Inc., xArm-Developer/xArm-Python-SDK, BSD 3-Clause licence · BSD-3-Clause · retrieved 2026-09-21
Project advice
Do not use UFACTORY Studio's simulated-arm mode or the SDK simulation flag as the simulation substrate for this project's M5 simulation-first work: both act on a connected controller and real arm, so neither isolates the agent from the machine.
This is advice from this project, based on: iface-142 Verified safety-034 Verified iface-147 Verified iface-148 Inferred
Why: Studio's simulated-arm mode needs a real arm connected, applies its settings to the real arm and can unlock the real joints (iface-142, safety-034). The SDK flag is a register write on a live controller connection (iface-147), and that controller is the real 850 control box (iface-148). A simulation substrate for simulation-first development must run with no path to the physical arm.
The record says
Before power-on, make sure the 850 cannot hit any person or equipment within its working range.
Ensure the 850 will not hit any personnel or equipment within the working range.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.3 Power Supply for 850
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Before power-on, check that the power and communication cables between the control box and the arm are properly connected.
Ensure the power cable and the communication wire are properly connected between the Control Box and the robotic arm.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.3 Power Supply for 850
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Before power-on, check that the network cable or RS-485 cable is properly connected.
Ensure the network cable or RS-485 cable is properly connected.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.3 Power Supply for 850
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
Before power-on, check that the control box power cable is properly connected.
Ensure the power cable for the Control Box is properly connected.
UFACTORY 850 Hardware Manual (online), 2. Hardware Installation · UFACTORY · 2.3 Power Supply for 850
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
The record says
S11, IntelliAware Factory Monitoring, provides AI-vision-based monitoring of factory operations, equipment, processes and safety.
AI vision-based monitoring of factory operations, equipment, processes, and safety.
IntelliMake Phase 1 Factory: Autonomous Production Demonstrator (infographic) · IntelliMake.org · S11 label and description
© IntelliMake.org. Used with permission; redrawn for this platform. · Cleared for use by its owner · retrieved 2026-09-21
Project copy; not published on this site.
Not known
The 850 product page and manual text do not themselves state conformance to ISO 10218-1 or ISO/TS 15066. The only ISO 10218 evidence found is the SGS verification linked from the manual, which is against EN ISO 10218-1:2011 (safety-082, safety-086). No assessment against the 2025 editions was found.
Related: lim-019 Gap safety-082 Verified safety-086 Inferred safety-122 Gap safety-126 Gap
Certifications Complete(CE)
UFACTORY 850 product page · UFACTORY · Service & Support > Certificates (the only certification listed) (page names the machine 'UFACTORY 850'; spec tables say 'UFactory 850')
© UFACTORY · All rights reserved; quoted briefly as evidence · retrieved 2026-09-21
IntelliMake diagrams are redrawn as native figures, © IntelliMake.org. UFACTORY does not endorse this platform.